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Fair Housing Act could not be interpreted
to mean that where large housing complex
was concerned, Negroes and other minority
applicants who were qualified could not obtain
available apartments on equal basis with whites,
but had to remain subject to owner's racial
quota, regardless of whether owner was private
or clothed with state authority. Civil Rights Act
of 1968, §§ 801, 804, 804(a-d), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
3601, 3604, 3604(a-d).

840 F.2d 1096
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STARRETT CITY ASSOCIATES,
Starrett City, Inc., Delmar Management
Company, Defendants-Appellants.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Docket 87-6132. | No. 1483. | Argued
July 16, 1987. | Decided March 1, 1988.
[2]
Attorney General brought action alleging violation of the
Fair Housing Act by private landlords who constructed,
owned and operated apartment housing complex. The United
States District Court, for the Eastern District of New York,
660 F.Supp. 668, Edward R. Neaher, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of Government and enjoined use of racial
quotas by apartment complex. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) regardless of
whether complex was clothed with state authority, racial
ceiling quotas were unlawful under Fair Housing Act; (2)
white flight phenomena could not be used as basis for denying
minority applicants same rights white applicants enjoyed
with respect to obtaining apartments; and (3) admittedly
deferential treatment of Negro and Hispanic applicants from
white applicants violated Fair Housing Act, regardless of
landlord's motivation.

78 Civil Rights
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination
Prohibited in General
78k1074 Housing
78k1082 Public Housing; Public Assistance
(Formerly 78k131, 78k11.5)

Use of racial ceiling quotas by privately
owned low income housing complex was
unlawful under Fair Housing Act despite owners'
argument that quotas were instituted to prevent
“white flight” phenomenon from transforming
complex from integrated housing community
to predominately minority community, where
quotas prevented qualified Negro and other
minority applicants from obtaining available
apartments on equal basis with whites. Civil
Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801, 804, 804(a-d), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 3601, 3604, 3604(a-d).

Affirmed.
Jon O. Newman, Circuit Judge, dissented with opinion.

West Headnotes (4)

[1]

Civil Rights
Public Housing; Public Assistance
78 Civil Rights
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination
Prohibited in General
78k1074 Housing
78k1082 Public Housing; Public Assistance
(Formerly 78k131, 78k11.5, 78k5)

Civil Rights
Public Housing; Public Assistance

14 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Civil Rights
Public Housing; Public Assistance
78 Civil Rights
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination
Prohibited in General
78k1074 Housing
78k1082 Public Housing; Public Assistance
(Formerly 78k131, 78k11.5)

Use of racial ceiling quotas by privately owned
low income housing complex, to maintain
current integration levels, violated Fair Housing
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Act, even though quotas were enacted to preserve
racial integration in complex and to prevent
white flight, where quotas caused qualified
Negro and other minority applicants to wait
longer for apartments than whites; racial quotas
were not permissible where they did not appear
temporary and were not enacted to remedy past
discrimination in complex. Civil Rights Act of
1968, §§ 801, 804, 804(a-d), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
3601, 3604, 3604(a-d).
18 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

Civil Rights
Public Housing; Public Assistance
78 Civil Rights
78I Rights Protected and Discrimination
Prohibited in General
78k1074 Housing
78k1082 Public Housing; Public Assistance
(Formerly 78k131, 78k11.5)

Although white flight phenomenon may be a
factor taken into account in integration equation
for privately owned low income housing project,
it cannot serve to justify attempts to maintain
integration levels at complex through inflexible
racial quotas which are neither temporary
in nature nor used to remedy past racial
discrimination or imbalance within the complex.
Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801, 804, 804(a-d),
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601, 3604, 3604(a-d).
12 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1097 William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
Washington, D.C. (David K. Flynn, William R. Yeomans,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Andrew J. Maloney,
U.S. Atty. for the Eastern District of N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y.,
of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Morris B. Abram, New York City (Colleen McMahon,
Michael G. Carey, Daniel L. Sosland, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,

Wharton & Garrison, New York City, of counsel), for
defendants-appellants.
Before NEWMAN, MINER and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
The United States Attorney General, on behalf of the United
States (“the government”), commenced this action under
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“Fair Housing
Act” or “the Act”) against defendants-appellants Starrett
City Associates, Starrett City, Inc. and Delmar Management
Company (collectively, “Starrett”) in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Neaher,
J.). The government maintained that Starrett's practices of
renting apartments in its Brooklyn housing complex solely on
the basis of applicants' race or national origin, and of making
apartments unavailable to black and hispanic applicants that
are then made available to white applicants, violate section
804(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d)
(1982).
The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment based
on extensive documentary submissions. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the government and
permanently enjoined appellants from discriminating on the
basis of race in the rental of apartments. Starrett appeals from
this judgment.

*1098 BACKGROUND
Appellants constructed, own and operate “Starrett City,”
the largest housing development in the nation, consisting
of 46 high-rise buildings containing 5,881 apartments in
Brooklyn, New York. The complex's rental office opened
in December 1973. Starrett has made capital contributions
of $19,091,000 to the project, the New York State Housing
Finance Agency has made $362,720,000 in mortgage loans,
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
subsidizes Starrett's monthly mortgage interest payments.
The United Housing Foundation abandoned a project to build
a development of cooperative apartments at the Starrett City
site in 1971. Starrett proposed to construct rental units on
the site on the condition that the New York City Board of
Estimate approve a transfer to Starrett of the city real estate
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tax abatement granted to the original project. The transfer
created “substantial community opposition” because “the
neighborhood surrounding the project and past experience
with subsidized housing” created fear that “the conversion
to rental apartments would result in Starrett City's becoming
an overwhelmingly minority development.” United States v.
Starrett City Assocs., 660 F.Supp. 668, 670 (E.D.N.Y.1987).
The transfer was approved, however, “upon the assurance
of Starrett City's developer that it was intended to create a
racially integrated community.” Id.
Starrett has sought to maintain a racial distribution by
apartment of 64% white, 22% black and 8% hispanic at
Starrett City. Id. at 671. Starrett claims that these racial
quotas are necessary to prevent the loss of white tenants,
which would transform Starrett City into a predominantly
minority complex. Starrett points to the difficulty it has had in
attracting an integrated applicant pool from the time Starrett
City opened, despite extensive advertising and promotional
efforts. Because of these purported difficulties, Starrett
adopted a tenanting procedure to promote and maintain
the desired racial balance. This procedure has resulted in
relatively stable percentages of whites and minorities living
at Starrett City between 1975 and the present. See id. at 672.
The tenanting procedure requires completion of a preliminary
information card stating, inter alia, the applicant's race
or national origin, family composition, income and
employment. The rental office at Starrett City receives and
reviews these applications. Those that are found preliminarily
eligible, based on family composition, income, employment
and size of apartment sought, are placed in “the active
file,” in which separate records by race are maintained for
apartment sizes and income levels. Applicants are told in
an acknowledgement letter that no apartments are presently
available, but that their applications have been placed in
the active file and that they will be notified when a unit
becomes available for them. When an apartment becomes
available, applicants are selected from the active file for final
processing, creating a processed applicant pool. As vacancies
arise, applicants of a race or national origin similar to that of
the departing tenants are selected from the pool and offered
apartments.
In December 1979, a group of black applicants brought an
action against Starrett in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. The district court certified

the plaintiff class in June 1983. Arthur v. Starrett City
Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y.1983). Plaintiffs alleged
that Starrett's tenanting procedures violated federal and state
law by discriminating against them on the basis of race.
The parties stipulated to a settlement in May 1984, and
a consent decree was entered subsequently, see Arthur v.
Starrett City Assocs., No. 79-CV-3096, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y.
April 2, 1985). The decree provided that Starrett would,
depending on apartment availability, make an additional 35
units available each year for a five-year period to black and
minority applicants. Id. at 10.
The government commenced the present action against
Starrett in June 1984, “to place before the [c]ourt the
issue joined but left expressly unresolved” in the Arthur
*1099 consent decree: the “legality of defendants' policy
and practice of limiting the number of apartments available
to minorities in order to maintain a prescribed degree of
racial balance.” United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 605
F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.N.Y.1985). The complaint alleged
that Starrett, through its tenanting policies, discriminated
in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, the
government maintained that Starrett violated the Act by
making apartments unavailable to blacks solely because of
race, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); by forcing black applicants to wait
significantly longer for apartments than whites solely because
of race, id. § 3604(b); by enforcing a policy that prefers
white applicants while limiting the numbers of minority
applicants accepted, id. § 3604(c); and by representing in an
acknowledgement letter that no apartments are available for
rental when in fact units are available, id. § 3604(d). Because
the government had refused to intervene in the Arthur suit,
defendants moved to dismiss this suit as barred under the
judicial estoppel doctrine. On April 2, 1985, that motion was
denied. 605 F.Supp. at 265.
Following a period for taking discovery, the government
moved for summary judgment on January 30, 1986.
Defendants made a cross-motion for summary judgment
on May 5, 1986. Extensive documentary submissions were
made, and arguments on the motion were heard on August
26, 1986.
Starrett maintained that the tenanting procedures “were
adopted at the behest of the [s]tate solely to achieve
and maintain integration and were not motivated by racial
animus.” 660 F.Supp. at 673. To support their position,
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appellants submitted the written testimony of three housing
experts. They described the “white flight” and “tipping”
phenomena, in which white residents migrate out of a
community as the community becomes poor and the
minority population increases, resulting in the transition
to a predominantly minority community. See id. at 674.
Acknowledging that “ ‘the tipping point for a particular
housing development, depending as it does on numerous
factors and the uncertainties of human behavior, is difficult
to predict with precision,’ ” one expert stated that the point at
which tipping occurs has been estimated at from 1% to 60%
minority population, but that the consensus ranged between
10% and 20%. Id. Another expert, who had prepared a report
in 1980 on integration at Starrett City for the New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, estimated
the complex's tipping point at approximately 40% black on
a population basis. Id. at 674-75. A third expert, who had
been involved in integrated housing ventures since the 1950's,
found that a 2:1 white-minority ratio produced successful
integration. See id. at 676.

unavailability to qualified minority applicants in order to
reserve units for whites. Id. at 676. Finally, the court rejected
Starrett's claim that the duty imposed upon government to
achieve housing integration justified its actions, stating that
“[d]efendants cannot arrogate to themselves the powers” of a
public housing authority. Id. at 678.

The court, however, accepted the government's contention
that Starrett's practices of making apartments unavailable for
blacks, while reserving them for whites, and conditioning
rental to minorities based on a “tipping formula” derived
only from race or national origin are clear violations
of the Fair Housing Act. The district court found that
apartment opportunities for blacks and hispanics were far
fewer “than would be expected if race and national origin
were not taken into account,” while opportunities for whites
were substantially greater than what their application rates
projected. Id. at 672. Minority applicants waited up to ten
times longer than the average white applicant before they
were offered an apartment. Id. at 676. Starrett City's active
file was 21.9% white in October 1985, but whites occupied
64.7% of the apartments in January 1984. Although the
file was 53.7% black and 18% hispanic in October 1985,
blacks and hispanics, respectively, occupied only 20.8% and
7.9% of the apartments as of January 1984. Id. at 672.
Appellants did not dispute this. Further, the court found
that appellants' tipping argument was undercut by the “wide
elasticity of that standard” and the lack of difficulty they
had in increasing their black quota from 21% to 35% “when
it became necessary to avoid litigating the private Arthur
lawsuit which threatened their unlawful rental practices.”
Id. at 678. The court also found that Starrett violated the
Act by making untrue representations of *1100 apartment

On appeal, Starrett presses arguments similar to those it
made before the district court. We affirm the district court's
judgment.

The court concluded that Starrett's obligation was “simply
and solely to comply with the Fair Housing Act” by treating
“black and other minority applicants ... on the same basis
as whites in seeking available housing at Starrett City.” Id.
The court noted that Starrett did not dispute any of the
operative facts alleged to show violations of the Fair Housing
Act. Id. at 672, 678-79. Accordingly, Judge Neaher granted
summary judgment for the government, enjoining Starrett
from discriminating against applicants on the basis of race
and “[r]equiring [them] to adopt written, objective, uniform,
nondiscriminatory tenant selection standards and procedures”
subject to the court's approval. Id. at 679. The court retained
jurisdiction over the parties for three years. Id.

DISCUSSION
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“Fair Housing
Act” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982), was
enacted pursuant to Congress' thirteenth amendment powers,
see Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 & 1027, 95 S.Ct. 495 & 507, 42
L.Ed.2d 294 & 302 (1974); United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 826, 94 S.Ct. 131, 38 L.Ed.2d 59 (1973); United
States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 235, 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972), “to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Section
3604 of the statute prohibits discrimination because of race,
color or national origin in the sale or rental of housing by,
inter alia: (1) refusing to rent or make available any dwelling,
id. § 3604(a); (2) offering discriminatory “terms, conditions
or privileges” of rental, id. § 3604(b); (3) making, printing
or publishing “any notice, statement, or advertisement ... that
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indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on race, color ... or national origin,” id. § 3604(c); and (4)
representing to any person “that any dwelling is not available
for ... rental when such dwelling is in fact so available,” id.
§ 3604(d).
[1] Housing practices unlawful under Title VIII include not
only those motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose,
but also those that disproportionately affect minorities. See,
e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032,
1036-37 (2d Cir.1979). Section 3604 “is designed to ensure
that no one is denied the right to live where they choose
for discriminatory reasons.” See Southend Neighborhood
Improv. Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th
Cir.1984). Although “not every denial, especially a temporary
denial, of low-income public housing has a discriminatory
impact on racial minorities” in violation of Title VIII, see
Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 577 (6th Cir.1986), an
action leading to discriminatory effects on the availability of
housing violates the Act, see Southend Neighborhood Improv.
Ass'n, 743 F.2d at 1209-10.
Starrett's allocation of public housing facilities on the
basis of racial quotas, by denying an applicant access
to a unit otherwise available solely because of race,
produces a “discriminatory effect ... [that] could hardly be
clearer,” Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F.Supp. 746, 770
(W.D.Pa.1982). Appellants do not contend that the plain
language of section 3604 does not proscribe their practices.
Rather, they claim to be “clothed with governmental
authority” and thus obligated, under Otero v. New York City
Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.1973), to effectuate the
purpose of the Fair Housing Act by affirmatively promoting
integration and preventing “the reghettoization of a model
integrated *1101 community.” We need not decide whether
Starrett is a state actor, however. Even if Starrett were a state
actor with such a duty, the racial quotas and related practices
employed at Starrett City to maintain integration violate the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Act.
Both Starrett and the government cite to the legislative
history of the Fair Housing Act in support of their
positions. This history consists solely of statements from
the floor of Congress. See Hunter, 459 F.2d at 210 n.
4. These statements reveal “that at the time that Title
VIII was enacted, Congress believed that strict adherence
to the anti-discrimination provisions of the [A]ct” would

eliminate “racially discriminatory housing practices [and]
ultimately would result in residential integration.” Burney,
551 F.Supp. at 769; see Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative
Action and the American Dream: Implementing Fair
Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74
Nw.U.L.Rev. 491, 538 n. 178 (1979). Thus, Congress saw
the antidiscrimination policy as the means to effect the
antisegregation-integration policy. See 551 F.Supp. at 769.
While quotas promote Title VIII's integration policy, they
contravene its antidiscrimination policy, bringing the dual
goals of the Act into conflict. The legislative history provides
no further guidance for resolving this conflict.
[2] We therefore look to analogous provisions of federal
law enacted to prohibit segregation and discrimination as
guides in determining to what extent racial criteria may be
used to maintain integration. Both the thirteenth amendment,
pursuant to which Title VIII was enacted, and the fourteenth
amendment empower Congress to act in eradicating racial
discrimination, Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573
F.2d 811, 816 n. 12 (3d Cir.1978), and both the fourteenth
amendment and Title VIII are informed by the congressional
goal of eradicating racial discrimination through the principle
of antidiscrimination, see Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 318 F.Supp. 669, 694 (W.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010, 91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971) (stating that
each of these provisions “proscribes discriminatory conduct
because of race or color”). Further, the parallel between the
antidiscrimination objectives of Title VIII and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1982), has been recognized. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.1982). Thus, the
Supreme Court's analysis of what constitutes permissible
race-conscious affirmative action under provisions of federal
law with goals similar to those of Title VIII provides a
framework for examining the affirmative use of racial quotas
under the Fair Housing Act.
Although any racial classification is presumptively
discriminatory, see Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979), a
race-conscious affirmative action plan does not necessarily
violate federal constitutional or statutory provisions, see, e.g.,
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S.Ct. 1053,
1064, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (plurality opinion) (fourteenth
amendment); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
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208, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2729, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979) (Title VII).
However, a race-conscious plan cannot be “ageless in [its]
reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability to affect the
future.” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106
S.Ct. 1842, 1848, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality opinion).
A plan employing racial distinctions must be temporary in
nature with a defined goal as its termination point. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 107 S.Ct.
1442, 1456, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987); Paradise, 107 S.Ct. at
1070; Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 106
S.Ct. 3019, 3053, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) (fifth amendment
equal protection); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489,
100 S.Ct. 2758, 2780, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980); Weber, 443
U.S. at 208-09, 99 S.Ct. at 2729-30; see also Jaimes v.
Lucas Metropolitan Housing Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th
Cir.1987) (stating that affirmative integration plan for public
housing authority “should end upon the [district] court's
finding that its goal has been accomplished”). Moreover,
*1102 we observe that societal discrimination alone seems
“insufficient and over expansive” as the basis for adopting
so-called “benign” practices with discriminatory effects “that
work against innocent people,” Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1848,
in the drastic and burdensome way that rigid racial quotas
do. Furthermore, the use of quotas generally should be based
on some history of racial discrimination, see id. at 1847,
or imbalance,see Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1452-53, within the
entity seeking to employ them. Finally, measures designed
to increase or ensure minority participation, such as “access”
quotas, see Burney, 551 F.Supp. at 763, have generally been
upheld, see, e.g., Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1456-57; Paradise,
107 S.Ct. at 1070-71; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 99 S.Ct. at
2729. However, programs designed to maintain integration
by limiting minority participation, such as ceiling quotas,
see Burney, 551 F.Supp. at 763, are of doubtful validity,
see Jaimes, 833 F.2d at 1207 (invalidating public housing
authority integration plan to the extent it acts as strict
racial quota), because they “ ‘single[ ] out those least well
represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a
benign program,’ ” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519, 100 S.Ct. at
2796 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 361, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2784, 57 L.Ed.2d 750
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).

maintenance. The quotas already have been in effect for ten
years. Appellants predict that their race-conscious tenanting
practices must continue for at least fifteen more years, but fail
to explain adequately how that approximation was reached.
In any event, these practices are far from temporary. Since
the goal of integration maintenance is purportedly threatened
by the potential for “white flight” on a continuing basis, no
definite termination date for Starrett's quotas is perceivable.
Second, appellants do not assert, and there is no evidence
to show, the existence of prior racial discrimination or
discriminatory imbalance adversely affecting whites within
Starrett City or appellants' other complexes. On the contrary,
Starrett City was initiated as an integrated complex, and
Starrett's avowed purpose for employing race-based tenanting
practices is to maintain that initial integration. Finally,
Starrett's quotas do not provide minorities with access to
Starrett City, but rather act as a ceiling to their access.
Thus, the impact of appellants' practices falls squarely on
minorities, for whom Title VIII was intended to open up
housing opportunities. Starrett claims that its use of quotas
serves to keep the numbers of minorities entering Starrett City
low enough to avoid setting off a wave of “white flight.”
Although the “white flight” phenomenon may be a factor
“take[n] into account in the integration equation,” Parent
Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d
705, 720 (2d Cir.1979), it cannot serve to justify attempts to
maintain integration at Starrett City through inflexible racial
quotas that are neither temporary in nature nor used to remedy
past racial discrimination or imbalance within the complex.

Appellants' reliance on Otero is misplaced. In Otero the New
York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) relocated over
1800 families in the Lower East Side of Manhattan to make
way for the construction of new apartment buildings. 484
F.2d at 1125. Pursuant to its regulations, NYCHA offered
the former site occupants first priority of returning to any
housing built within the urban renewal area. Id. at 1125-26.
However, because the response by the largely minority former
site residents seeking to return was nearly seven times greater
than expected, NYCHA declined to follow its regulation in
order to avoid creating a “pocket ghetto” that would “tip”
an integrated community towards a predominantly minority
community. Id. at 1124, 1126. It instead rented up half of
these apartments to non-former site occupants, 88% of whom
[3]
[4] Starrett's use of ceiling quotas to maintain were white. Id. at 1128.
integration at Starrett City lacks each of these characteristics.
First, Starrett City's practices have only the goal of integration
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In a suit brought by former site occupants who were
denied the promised priority, the district court held as a
matter of *1103 law that “affirmative action to achieve
racially balanced communities was not permitted where
it would result in depriving minority groups” of public
housing, and thus granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. Id. at 1130. This court reversed the grant of
summary judgment, stating that public housing authorities
had a federal constitutional and statutory duty “to fulfill, as
much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in
ghettos,” but we recognized that “the effect in some instances
might be to prevent some members of a racial minority from
residing in publicly assisted housing in a particular location.”
Id. at 1133-34.
Otero does not, however, control in this case. The challenge
in Otero did not involve procedures for the long-term
maintenance of specified levels of integration, but rather,
the rental of 171 of 360 new apartments to non-former
site occupants, predominantly white, although former site
residents, largely minority, sought those apartments and were
entitled to priority under NYCHA's own regulation. The
Otero court did not delineate the statutory or constitutional
limits on permissible means of integration, but held only that
NYCHA's rent-up practice could not be declared invalid as a
matter of law under those limits. In fact, the court in Otero
observed that the use of race-conscious tenanting practices
might allow landlords “to engage in social engineering,
subject only to general undefined control through judicial
supervision” and could “constitute a form of unlawful racial
discrimination.” Id. at 1136.
It is particularly important to note that the NYCHA action
challenged in Otero only applied to a single event-the initial
rent up of the new complexes-and determined tenancy in
the first instance alone. NYCHA sought only to prevent
the immediate creation of a “pocket ghetto” in the Lower
East Side, which had experienced a steady loss of white
population, that would tip the precarious racial balance there,
resulting in increased white flight and inevitable “non-white
ghettoization of the community.” Id. at 1124. Further, the
suspension of NYCHA's regulation did not operate as a
strict racial quota, because the former site residents entitled
to a rental priority were approximately 40% white, id. at
1128. As a one-time measure in response to the special
circumstances of the Lower East Side in the early 1970's, the

action challenged in Otero had an impact on non-whites as
a group far less burdensome or discriminatory than Starrett
City's continuing practices.

CONCLUSION
We do not intend to imply that race is always an inappropriate
consideration under Title VIII in efforts to promote integrated
housing. We hold only that Title VIII does not allow
appellants to use rigid racial quotas of indefinite duration
to maintain a fixed level of integration at Starrett City by
restricting minority access to scarce and desirable rental
accommodations otherwise available to them. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the district court.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act to prohibit racial
segregation in housing. Starrett City is one of the most
successful examples in the nation of racial integration in
housing. I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that
Congress intended the Fair Housing Act to prohibit the
maintenance of racial integration in private housing.

I.
Starrett City is a privately owned apartment complex in
Brooklyn. It consists of 46 high-rise buildings containing
5,881 rental units. Nearly 17,000 people live there. From
its inception Starrett City has been planned and operated to
achieve and maintain racial integration.
The complex was originally to have been built as a
cooperatively owned housing development by the sponsor of
Co-Op City in the Bronx. When financing was not obtained,
the project was taken over by the current owner, whose
business was rental *1104 housing. Because New York City
had given the previous developer substantial tax abatements,
the City's approval was necessary if Starrett City was to have
the benefit of these tax abatements. The prospect of a large,
low-income rental housing complex generated considerable
political opposition within the City from those who feared
that the project would attract only minority tenants. The
new owner and the New York State Division of Housing
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and Community Renewal (DHCR) gave assurances that
affirmative steps would be taken to maintain Starrett City as
an integrated community. On these assurances, the New York
City Board of Estimate approved the construction of Starrett
City as a rental development.
At that time, DHCR policy called for an integration goal of
70% majority and 30% minority tenants in state-sponsored
projects. The defendants adopted this goal for Starrett
City. Since the size of tenants' families varied, the target
percentages reflected the anticipated racial distribution of
rental units, rather than of persons living in the complex.
To reach its target of racial balance, Starrett City explicitly
declined to rent on a first-come, first-served basis. Instead,
reacting to the fact that Blacks and other minorities applied
for apartments at Starrett City in far greater numbers than
Whites, the management imposed ceilings on the number of
apartments of various sizes that would be rented to Blacks
and other minorities. As the number of tenants of each
minority reached the ceiling for a particular size of apartment,
subsequent applicants from that minority were placed on a
waiting list until sufficient vacancies occurred to permit a
rental to a member of that minority without exceeding the
established ceiling.
As experience with this rental policy developed, Starrett City
decided that it would permit the percentage of apartments
rented to minorities to move above 30% and to reach
approximately 35%. The components of this aggregate figure
are 21% Black, 8% Hispanic, 4.5% Oriental, and 2% other
or mixed. These figures have been fairly constant since 1976.
During that period the minority percentage of the Starrett City
population has been approximately 45%. In 1984, Starrett
City agreed, as part of a settlement of a lawsuit brought by
a class of Black applicants, to raise the minority rental unit
percentage to 38% over five years.
The consequence of Starrett's policy of maintaining racial
balance has been that Black applicants constitute a
disproportionately larger share of the waiting list for
apartments than do Whites, and remain on the list for
considerably longer periods of time than do Whites. As of
November 1985, Blacks made up approximately 54% of
the waiting list while Whites filled approximately 22% of
the places on the list. For a two-bedroom apartment, the
average waiting time on the list for qualified applicants was
twenty months for Blacks and two months for Whites; for a

one-bedroom apartment, the comparable figures were eleven
months and four months. 1
1

Occasionally, the burden of Starrett City's rental
policy falls on Whites. The complex designates certain
buildings for senior citizens and, during periods when
White seniors have applied for these units in greater
numbers than Black seniors, White seniors have waited
for apartments longer than Black seniors.

The development of Starrett City as an apartment complex
committed to a deliberate policy of maintained racial
integration has at all times occurred with the knowledge,
encouragement, and financial support of the agency of
the United States directly concerned with housing, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Under a contract between HUD and Starrett City, the federal
government pays all but one percent of the debt service of
the mortgage loan extended to Starrett City by the New York
State Housing Finance Agency (HFA). By March 1986 HUD
had paid HFA more than $211 million on Starrett City's
behalf. In exchange for this interest subsidy, Starrett City
agreed to limit the rent for eligible tenants to a monthly
figure specified by HUD or to a stated percentage of the
tenant's monthly income (initially 25%, now 30%), whichever
is greater. In addition, HUD has provided *1105 rental
subsidies for tenants with low incomes. Since 1981 these
rental subsidies have been nearly $22 million a year.
Despite its close cooperation in the development of Starrett
City as an integrated housing complex, the United States
now sues Starrett City to force it to abandon the rental
policies that have enabled it to maintain racial integration.
The bringing of the suit raises a substantial question as to
the Government's commitment to integrated housing. The
timing of the suit puts that commitment further in doubt.
In 1979 a class of Black applicants for housing at Starrett
City brought suit to challenge on federal statutory and
constitutional grounds the same tenant selection policies at
issue in this case. Arthur v. Starrett City Associates, 79 Civ.
3096 (ERN) (E.D.N.Y.1979). With the federal government
observing from the sidelines, the parties to the Arthur
litigation engaged in protracted settlement negotiations. More
than four years later, a mutually advantageous settlement
was reached. Starrett City was permitted to continue its
policy of maintaining integration through its tenant selection
policies. In return, Starrett City agreed to increase by three
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percent over five years the proportion of rental units occupied
by minority tenants. At the same time, DHCR, the state
housing agency, which was also a defendant in the Arthur
litigation, agreed to take affirmative steps to promote housing
opportunities for minorities in DHCR-supervised housing
projects in New York City. Specifically, the State agency
agreed to give a priority in other projects to minority
applicants on the Starrett City waiting list. No member of
the class of minority applicants for housing at Starrett City
objected to the settlement. Thus, the needs of the minority
class for whose benefit the suit had been brought were met to
their satisfaction by providing for more rental opportunities
both at Starrett City and elsewhere. Just one month after
that settlement was reached, the United States filed this suit,
ostensibly concerned with vindication of the rights of the
same minority applicants for housing who had just settled
their dispute on favorable terms.

II.
The only issue in this case is whether Starrett City's rental
policies violate Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), generally
known as the “Fair Housing Act.” The United States has
explicitly declined to assert any claim of a constitutional
violation. See Brief for Appellee at 27 n. 9.
The defendants do not dispute that their rental policies fall
within the literal language of Title VIII's prohibition on
discriminatory housing practices. 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
Instead they contend that they are state actors for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that their policies are to be tested
under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing
Act by the strict scrutiny standard of Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57
L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), and that they meet this test because their
race-conscious policies further the compelling state interest
of promoting integrated housing and are narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. At a minimum, they contend, they are
entitled to a trial on the merits to prove their claim.
2

Though no applicants have been barred from housing
because of their race, it is admitted that minority
applicants, because of their race, remain on the Starrett
City waiting list longer than White applicants.

In my view, the defendants are entitled to prevail simply on
the statutory issue to which the Government has limited its
lawsuit. Though the terms of the statute literally encompass
the defendants' actions, the statute was never intended to
apply to such actions. This statute was intended to bar
perpetuation of segregation. To apply it to bar maintenance
of integration is precisely contrary to the congressional policy
“to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
We have been wisely cautioned by Learned Hand that “[t]here
is no surer way *1106 to misread a document than to
read it literally.” Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624
(2d Cir.1944) (concurring opinion), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco,
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921
(1945). That aphorism is not always true with respect to
statutes, whose text is always the starting point for analysis
and sometimes the ending point. But literalism is not always
the appropriate approach even with statutes, as the Supreme
Court long ago recognized: “It is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intent of
its makers.” Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892).
Title VIII bars discriminatory housing practices in order
to end segregated housing. Starrett City is not promoting
segregated housing. On the contrary, it is maintaining
integrated housing. It is surely not within the spirit of the Fair
Housing Act to enlist the Act to bar integrated housing. Nor
is there any indication that application of the statute toward
such a perverse end was within the intent of those who enacted
the statute. It is true that there are some statements in the
legislative history that broadly condemn discrimination for
“any” reason. Senator Mondale, the principal sponsor of Title
VIII, said that “we do not see any good reason or justification,
in the first place, for permitting discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing.” 114 Cong.Rec. 5642 (1968). But his
context, like that in which the entire debate occurred, 3
concerned maintenance of segregation, not integration. His
point was that there was no reason for discriminating against
a Black who wished to live in a previously all-White housing
project. He explicitly decried the prospect that “we are going
to live separately in white ghettos and Negro ghettos.” Id. at
2276. The purpose of Title VIII, he said, was to replace the
ghettos “by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” Id.
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at 3422. As he pointed out, “[O]ne of the biggest problems
we face is the lack of experience in actually living next
to Negroes.” Id. at 2275. Starrett City is committed to the
proposition that Blacks and Whites shall live next to each
other. A law enacted to enhance the opportunity for people of
all races to live next to each other should not be interpreted
to prevent a landlord from maintaining one of the most
successful integrated housing projects in America.
3

Because Title VIII was offered as a floor amendment in
the Senate, there are no committee reports.

None of the legislators who enacted Title VIII ever expressed
a view on whether they wished to prevent the maintenance
of racially balanced housing. Most of those who passed this
statute in 1968 probably could not even contemplate a private
real estate owner who would deliberately set out to achieve a
racially balanced tenant population. Had they thought of such
an eventuality, there is not the slightest reason to believe that
they would have raised their legislative hands against it.
This Circuit has previously ruled that Title VIII does not apply
literally to prohibit racially based rental policies adopted
to promote integration. Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.1973). In that case a
public housing authority had committed itself by regulation
to give first priority for rental housing to applicants who had
been displaced by construction of the project. The housing
authority then disregarded its own regulation, based on its
apprehension that giving first priority to the class of those
displaced from the site, most of whom were non-White,
would cause the project to pass the so-called “tipping point”
and become predominantly non-White. The first question in
Otero was whether the authority's deliberate decision not to
honor its priority policy because the benefitted class was
predominantly non-White violated Title VIII. The Court held
that the Act was not violated simply because a race-conscious
decision had been made in connection with rental policy:
Congress' desire in providing fair
housing throughout the United States
was to *1107 stem the spread of
urban ghettos and to promote open,
integrated housing, even though the
effect in some instances might be to
prevent some members of a racial
minority from residing in publicly

assisted housing in a particular
location.
Id. at 1134.
Once the Court decided that a race-conscious rental policy did
not necessarily violate the Act, it then faced the difficult issue
in the case-whether the Act imposed an affirmative duty to
promote integration of sufficient force to permit the authority
to violate its own regulation. On that issue, the Court also
ruled in favor of the authority, remanding for a trial at which
the defendant could establish that its apprehension concerning
a “tipping point” was well founded and that abandonment of
its priority policy was necessary to promote integration.
Our case is much easier than Otero. Starrett City is not
seeking to be released from a commitment it has previously
made to any of the applicants for housing. To prevail it need
not find in Title VIII some affirmative obligation compelling
it to promote integration. It has freely chosen to promote
integration and is entitled to prevail unless something in
Title VIII forbids its voluntary policy. If anything in Title
VIII prohibited race-conscious rental policies adopted to
promote integration, Otero would have been summarily
decided against the defendant.
Acknowledging the significance of the ruling in Otero, the
Court distinguishes it essentially on the ground that Otero
involved a policy of limited duration, applicable only to the
period in which those displaced from the site were applying
for housing in the new project, whereas Starrett City seeks
to pursue a long-term policy of maintaining integration. I
see nothing in the text or legislative history of Title VIII
that supports such a distinction. If, as the Court holds, Title
VIII bars Starrett City's race-conscious rental policy, even
though adopted to promote and maintain integration, then it
would bar such policies whether adopted on a short-term or
a long-term basis. Since the Act makes no distinction among
the durations of rental policies alleged to violate its terms,
Otero's upholding of a race-conscious rental policy adopted
to promote integration cannot be ignored simply because the
policy was of limited duration. 4
4

The Court, drawing a parallel between Title VIII and
Title VII, which bars discrimination in employment,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), supports its view of Title
VIII with Supreme Court decisions approving only
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limited use of race-conscious remedies under statutory
and constitutional standards in the employment context.
Though Titles VIII and VII share a common objective
of combatting discrimination, their differing contexts
preclude the assumption that the law of affirmative
action developed for employment is readily applicable
to housing. The Title VII cases have not been concerned
with a “tipping point” beyond which a work force
might become segregated. Yet that is a demonstrated
fact of life in the context of housing. Cf. Parent Ass'n
of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d
705, 718-20 (2d Cir.1979) (recognizing validity of a
“tipping point” concern in the public school context in
the course of framing a remedial desegregation decree).
The statutory issue arising under Title VIII should be
decided on the basis of what practices Congress was
proscribing when it enacted this provision. Whether
the constitutional standards for affirmative action differ
between the employment and housing contexts need
not be considered since the Government has explicitly
declined in this litigation to advance any claim of
unconstitutional action.

But even if Title VIII can somehow be construed to make
the lawfulness of a race-conscious rental policy that promotes
integration turn on the duration of the policy, Starrett City
is entitled to a trial so that it can prove its contention
that its policy is still needed to maintain integration. In the
District Court the Government, though seeking summary
judgment, contested Starrett City's factual contention that
a race-conscious rental policy was currently needed to
prevent the complex from passing the “tipping point” and
becoming segregated. The Government relied on a brief
affidavit of a HUD employee, who made primarily the
unremarkable observation that it is difficult to predict with
any certainty the precise “tipping point” in a particular
neighborhood. In opposing summary judgment, Starrett City
presented detailed affidavits providing abundant evidence to
show that abandonment of its *1108 rental policies would
cause the complex to pass the “tipping point” and soon
become a segregated development. This evidence was solidly
based on relevant experience. Several housing developments
near Starrett City, operating without a policy of integration
maintenance, have become racially segregated, including one
across the street from Starrett City.
Otero established for this Circuit that a race-conscious rental
policy adopted to promote integration does not violate Title
VIII and that a defendant must be afforded an opportunity to

demonstrate at a trial that its rental policy is needed to prevent
a housing complex from becoming segregated. Starrett City's
affidavit evidence may well be sufficient to entitle it to
summary judgment on this issue of continued need for a raceconscious rental policy to maintain integration. At a minimum
it is entitled to a trial to present its evidence to a trier of fact. 5
5

The Court faults Starrett City for not adequately
explaining the basis for its estimate of the time during
which its rental policies would have to be retained in
the future in order to avoid segregation. If such an
explanation is needed, the Court should remand for a trial
so that witnesses can be called to provide it. In any event,
the issue is whether Title VIII prohibits what Starrett City
is doing today, not whether Starrett City has made an
incorrect estimate of what it will have to do sometime in
the future to maintain integration.

Whether integration of private housing complexes should
be maintained through the use of race-conscious rental
policies that deny minorities an equal opportunity to rent
is a highly controversial issue of social policy. There is a
substantial argument against imposing any artificial burdens
on minorities in their quest for housing. On the other
hand, there is a substantial argument against forcing an
integrated housing complex to become segregated, even if
current conditions make integration feasible only by means
of imposing some extra delay on minority applicants for
housing. Officials of the Department of Justice are entitled to
urge the former policy. Respected civil rights advocates like
the noted psychologist, Dr. Kenneth Clark, are entitled to urge
the latter policy, as he has done in an affidavit filed in this suit.
That policy choice should be left to the individual decisions of
private property owners unless and until Congress or the New
York legislature decides for the Nation or for New York that it
prefers to outlaw maintenance of integration. I do not believe
Congress made that decision in 1968, and it is a substantial
question whether it would make such a decision today. Until
Congress acts, we should not lend our authority to the result
this lawsuit will surely bring about. In the words of Dr. Clark:
[I]t would be a tragedy of the highest
magnitude if this litigation were to lead
to the destruction of one of the model
integrated communities in the United
States.
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Because the Fair Housing Act does not require this tragedy to
occur, I respectfully dissent.
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